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Term structure models have often been criticized for failing to explain satisfactorily the yield spread betweencorporate and Treasury bonds. A potential problem is that the personal tax effect is ignored in these models.
In this paper, we employ a structural model to investigate the role of personal taxes on both debt and equity
returns in capital structure decisions and assess their impact on corporate bond yield spreads. It is shown that
personal taxes affect the ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure, and the tax premium explains a substantial portion of
yield spreads, especially for high-grade bonds. The predictive ability of the model for yield spreads is much
improved when personal tax effects are accounted for. In controlling for the liquidity effect, we obtain implied
personal income tax rates closely in line with Graham’s (1999) estimates.
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1. Introduction
Term structure models have often been criticized for
their inability to generate high enough spreads to be
consistent with the spreads observed in the corpo-
rate bond market. Since the seminal work of Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), a vast litera-
ture has been developed in an attempt to improve
the performance of these models to catch up with
observed spreads by allowing for stochastic interest
rates, jumps, strategic defaults, coupons, and incom-
plete accounting information. For example, Black and
Cox (1976), Kim et al. (1993), Leland (1994, 1998),
Goldstein et al. (2001), Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996), Anderson et al. (1996), and Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997) consider endogenous or strategic
defaults. Kim et al. (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995), and Huang et al. (2003) consider stochastic
interest rates. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)
incorporate stationary leverage ratios. Zhou (2001)
and Huang and Huang (2003) incorporate jump risk.
Dufﬁe and Lando (2001) take into account noisy
accounting information. Despite these efforts, the
so-called credit spread puzzle remains alive and well
today, although in a somewhat different form. Jones
et al. (1984) ﬁrst documented the credit spread puz-
zle that a simple Merton (1974) model of default risk
applied to zero-coupon bonds substantially under-
estimates spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) ﬁnd
that structural models explain only a small por-
tion of changes in spreads. In a comprehensive
study, by calibrating a large class of term structure
models to be consistent with historical default loss
experience, Huang and Huang (2003) conclude that
default risk accounts for only a small portion of the
observed corporate-Treasury spread for investment-
grade bonds. Moreover, Eom et al. (2003) show that
while most structural models fail to account for major
determinants of credit spreads, they can both under-
estimate and overestimate spreads. They ﬁnd that for
most models, the accuracy of prediction remains a
serious problem; predicted spreads are often too small
for safer bonds or too large for high-risk bonds, while
the average prediction error is not very informative.
A consensus from these studies is that some major
factors are still missing in the term structure mod-
els, of which a potentially important candidate is
personal taxes. It has been long recognized that
taxes affect yield spreads (see Kidwell and Trzcinka
1982, Trzcinka 1982, Yawitz et al. 1985, and Miller
1977). However, most term structure models have
ignored personal taxes, a rather surprising omission.
Although some studies have proclaimed that taxes
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explain a sizable proportion of credit spreads and, in
relative terms, are the most important determinant
of credit spreads of safer bonds, few serious theo-
retical models, or empirical assessments have been
attempted. Elton et al. (2001) are the ﬁrst to exam-
ine the effect of personal taxes using a reduced-
form term structure model. Cooper and Davydenko
(2003) develop a structural model based on the
Merton (1974) framework demonstrating that taxes
may account for 10 to 35 basis points of corporate
bond spread. In their model, tax spread is indepen-
dent of default risk because of assumptions of sym-
metric taxation for capital gains and ordinary income,
as well as the independence of capital structure from
personal taxes.
In this paper, we propose a model to incorporate
the effects of personal taxes associated with both
debt and equity returns on the term structure of cor-
porate bonds. To the best of our knowledge, our
paper represents the ﬁrst effort to quantify the rela-
tive importance of personal tax effects on debt and
equity prices by taking into account their feedback
into capital structure decisions. Our model is a gen-
eralization of the traditional structural models with
endogenous default along the line of Leland (1994)
and Leland and Toft (1996). The structural approach
offers distinct advantages for modeling the effects
of taxes and default. First, the structural approach
provides an integrated framework that simultane-
ously addresses the issues related to capital struc-
ture, default probability, and yield spreads. It allows
us to establish the linkage among important ﬁnancial
decisions and identify channels through which per-
sonal tax effects may occur. This contrasts with the
reduced-form or time-series approach, which takes
either spreads or default probability as exogenously
given and deals with these two variables separately.
Second, the so-called credit spread puzzle, or to a
lesser extent, the default probability level puzzle,
exists largely because of an investigation within the
contingent claims framework.1 Therefore, the struc-
tural approach is a natural choice to explain these
puzzles. Finally, structural models appear to provide
more economic insight and predictive power (see
Collin-Dufresne et al. 2003), which can help us better
understand the nature of the personal tax effect and
its economic signiﬁcance.
We chose the Leland-Toft (1996) approach to inves-
tigate the role of personal taxes because it allows us to
determine debt values (and yield spreads) and opti-
mal capital structure in a uniﬁed framework. This
framework effectively deals with the issue of the
1 The authors thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this
important fact. Empirically, default probability implied by the yield
spread has been much higher than historical default probability.
interrelationship among taxes, capital structure, and
yield spreads. A complication involved in this issue
is that debt values and capital structure are inter-
dependent. Within this structural framework, default
is modeled as an optimal strategy by equity hold-
ers, whereby the default boundary and capital struc-
ture are endogenously determined. The debt value
depends on the default boundary optimally chosen
by equity holders. It can be shown that personal
taxes affect equity holders’ optimal choice of capi-
tal structure and default boundary which, in turn,
affects default risk, debt value, and yield spread. We
ﬁnd that personal taxes generally reduce the value of
risky debts, and more importantly, that there are pro-
found interactive effects among taxes, leverage, and
default risk.
The key question to be addressed is how much of
the observed corporate spread is because of personal
taxes. To answer this question, we calibrate the model
based on the historical default and equity return data
as in Huang and Huang (2003). The calibration allows
us to obtain estimates of yield spreads that match the
observed default loss experience and market risk pre-
mium. This procedure generates robust estimates of
yield spreads. Huang and Huang (2003) show that
very different models produce remarkably consis-
tent spreads when they are calibrated to ﬁt observed
default loss data. This conclusion holds even after
they account for the countercyclical market risk pre-
mium and jump risk in the ﬁrm value process. A sig-
niﬁcant implication from this ﬁnding is that choice of
model structure is not terribly important. Thus, one
can use a particular model to draw a reliable inference
rather than involve a large class of models in the lit-
erature, because the predictive ability of these models
will be comparable once they are carefully calibrated
to actual default data.
We use our calibrated model to assess the effects of
personal taxes. The calibrated model generates a more
precise quantitative measure of tax spread. We ﬁnd
that personal taxes account for a substantial portion of
spreads for investment-grade bonds. When personal
taxes are ignored, the model explains only 31%–41%
of investment-grade bond spreads. After including
empirical tax rates documented by Graham (1999)
into the model, the percentage of the investment-
grade bond spread explained by the model increases
to a range of 47%–87%. The percentage increase in
spread because of personal taxes is particularly sig-
niﬁcant for AAA (from 41%–87%) and AA (from
33%–65%) bonds. Furthermore, by adjusting observed
spreads for liquidity premiums of bonds with differ-
ent ratings (see de Jong and Driessen 2004), we obtain
implied personal tax rates from observed yields. The
implied tax rates for investment-grade bonds are very
close to those documented by Graham (1999). Results
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show that the structural model performs very well
and personal taxes are an important determinant of
corporate spreads. Recently, Leland (2002) has shown
that structural models can predict default probabil-
ity very accurately. Schaefer and Strebulaev (2004)
ﬁnd that structural models explain a large fraction of
returns on investment-grade bonds and provide accu-
rate predictions of hedge ratios. These ﬁndings sug-
gest that the failure of structural models to explain
corporate bond spreads is more likely because of
missing factors unrelated to credit risk than to their
inability to predict default probability. Our results
strongly support this view by identifying personal
taxes as an important missing factor unrelated to
credit risk. Our ﬁndings also suggest that it will
be fruitful to incorporate personal taxes into these
two models to see whether their performance can be
improved.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 generalizes the Leland-Toft (1996) model to
incorporate the effects of personal taxes. Section 3
conducts numerical analysis to examine the perfor-
mance of the model and shows how personal taxes
affect capital structure, default boundary, ﬁrm value,
bond yields, and yield spread. Section 4 introduces
the calibration procedure and presents the results gen-
erated from the calibrated model. Section 5 presents
concluding remarks.
2. Finite Maturity Debt with Personal
Taxes
2.1. The General Setting
In this section, we introduce personal taxes into the
term structure model. The tax environment for the
model is as follows.2 The coupon payment of a cor-
porate bond is taxed as ordinary income and capital
gains are taxed at the capital gains tax rate, which
depends on the length of time the bond is held. If the
holding period is less than a year, gains are treated
as short-term gains and taxed at the ordinary income
tax rate. If the holding period is one year or longer,
gains are taxed at a lower long-term capital gains tax
rate.3 If default occurs, the default loss is treated as
a capital loss. The investor receives a rebate from the
government, which depends on his tax status and the
length of time the bond was held. The long-term cap-
ital gains (or loss) tax rate is typically a fraction of the
regular income tax rate. Denote the ordinary income
tax rate as  and the capital gains tax rate as  ,
2 For a detailed tax treatment of ﬁxed income securities and default
loss, see Fabozzi and Nirenberg (1991), Yawitz et al. (1985), and
Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984).
3 The required holding period for long-term gains was six months
in 1942–1977.
where 0< ≤ 1. Historically, long-term capital gains
tax rates have varied from 20%–100% of the ordinary
income tax rate.4 Interest income and capital gains
from corporate bonds are subject to both state S
and federal F  taxes. Therefore, the effective ordi-
nary income tax rate for corporate bond investors is
 = F + S1 − F  because state tax is a deduction
against federal income tax.
Consider that the evolution of the asset value of
an unlevered ﬁrm, V , has the following continuous
diffusion process:
dV
V
= 
V  t− dt+ dZ (1)
where V  t is the total expected rate of return on
the ﬁrm’s assets,  is the total payout ratio, which
is a proportion of value paid to all security holders,
Z is a standard Wiener process, and  is the constant
volatility parameter of the asset return (see Leland
and Toft 1996, Merton 1974, Black and Cox 1976, and
Brennan and Schwartz 1978). The value V includes
the net cash ﬂows generated by the ﬁrm’s activities
and excludes cash ﬂows from debt ﬁnancing.
Next, consider a risky debt issue with maturity
t periods from the present. The debt has a contin-
uous constant coupon ﬂow ct and principal pt.
There exists a default-free asset in the market, which
pays a continuous interest rate r . The value process of
the levered ﬁrm continues without time limit until it
reaches a default boundary VB. Once the asset value
reaches this boundary, the ﬁrm defaults on its debt. If
default occurs, bondholders receive a fraction  of the
asset value VB, where  is assumed to be a constant, or
= 1− is the fraction of ﬁrm value lost because of
default. Bondholders pursue a buy-and-hold invest-
ment strategy.
Under the risk-neutral valuation, the value of the
debt, d, is given by
dV VB t =
∫ t
0
1− cte−rs
1− F sV VB ds
+ 
pt−pt− dV VB te−rt
· 
1− F tV VB
+
∫ t
0

VB +dV VB t−VBe−rs
· f sV VBds (2)
where F sV VB is the cumulative default proba-
bility up to time s, and f sV VB is the incremen-
tal default probability from time s to s + s when
4 Also, in some periods, alternate treatment could be elected (e.g.,
for large gains). Differential deductibility or tax rebate of default
loss has been in place since 1922. In the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
capital gains and regular income are treated equally and there is
no differential tax treatment between short- and long-term gains.
The top individual capital gains tax rate is currently 15%.
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the drift rate is r − . The ﬁrst term on the right
side is the discounted expected after-tax value of the
coupon ﬂow paid at time s with a probability of
1− F sV VB. The second term represents the dis-
counted expected after-tax repayment value of princi-
pal, where pt−d is the capital gains tax liability
at maturity, with a probability of no default before
maturity t, 1 − F tV VB. The third term is the
expected residual debt value VB plus the tax rebate,
d−VB, from the investment loss if default occurs
before maturity. The values of the ﬁrst and second
terms are negatively related to the personal income
tax rate, while the third term is positively related
given VB.
By integrating (2), we can obtain the debt value
dV VB t
= 1− ct
r
+ e−rt
[
pt−pt− dV VB t
− 1− ct
r
]
1− F t+
[
tVB +dV VB t
−tVB−
1− ct
r
]
Gt (3)
where Gt= ∫ t
s=0 e
−rsf sV VBds. Solving (3) for the
debt value yields
dV VB t
=
(
1− ct
r
+ e−rt
[
1−pt− 1− ct
r
]
· 1− F t+
[
1−tVB −
1− ct
r
]
Gt
)
· 1−
e−rt1− F t+Gt−1 (4)
where F t and Gt are given by
F t=N
h1t+
(
VB
V
)2a
N 
h2t (5)
Gt=
(
VB
V
)a−z
N 
q1t+
(
VB
V
)a+z
N 
q1t# (6)
N· denotes the cumulative standard normal distri-
bution, and
q1t=
−b− z2t

√
t
 q2t=
−b+ z2t

√
t

h1t=
−b− a2t

√
t
 h2t=
−b+ a2t

√
t

a= r − − 
2/2
2
 b= ln
(
V
VB
)

z= 
a
22+ 2r21/2
2
#
(7)
The cumulative distribution function of the ﬁrst
passage time to default, F t, and the integrated dis-
counted density of the ﬁrst passage time, Gt, are
critical elements for the determination of the debt
value. It is important to note that F t and Gt
depend on VB, which, as will be shown later, is a func-
tion of personal taxes. Thus, personal taxes affect the
default strategy of equity holders and debt value.
It is assumed that the ﬁrm continuously issues a
constant principal amount of new debt with matu-
rity T years from issuance, which will be redeemed at
par upon maturity if the ﬁrm remains solvent. New
debt is issued with a principal amount of p = P/T
each year, where P is the total principal amount of
outstanding debts. The same amount of old debt is
retired per year, and so the debt structure is station-
ary. So long as the ﬁrm remains solvent, the total
outstanding principal amount is P at any time s and
the ﬁrm has a uniform distribution of principal over
maturities in the interval s s+ T . The total coupon
payment is C per year and there are T debts, each
with a constant coupon payment of c = C/T and a
principal amount of p. The total annual amount of
debt service is equal to C+P/T . The value of all out-
standing debts D can be determined by integrating
the debt ﬂow dV VB t over the period of T :
DV VBT =
∫ T
t=0
dV VB t dt# (8)
The value of D depends on the personal income tax
rate as d is a function of  (see (3)).
2.2. Endogenous Default Boundary and the
Optimal Capital Structure
The tax shield beneﬁt of interest payments offers an
incentive for ﬁrms to issue debt. But as the ﬁrm’s
leverage rises, the likelihood of default increases.
Because default is costly, ﬁrms must weigh the tax
beneﬁt of leverage against the cost of ﬁnancial distress
in the debt ﬁnancing decision. In addition, the corpo-
rate tax savings from debt interest service are offset
by the personal tax disadvantage to bond investors.
The personal tax disadvantage to investors from hold-
ing debt relative to holding equity causes them to
demand higher pretax returns on corporate debt,
thereby reducing the ﬁrm’s incentive for debt ﬁnanc-
ing. Furthermore, equity returns are also subject to
taxes, with an effective rate typically lower than that
on debts. The higher the taxes are on equity, the more
likely it is that the ﬁrm will issue debt. The optimal
capital structure thus hinges on both debt and equity
taxes.
The total value of the levered ﬁrm is equal to the
asset value of the unlevered ﬁrm plus leverage ben-
eﬁts less bankruptcy costs. Given the asset value of
the unlevered ﬁrm V t, equity value EV VBT , tax
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beneﬁt hV VB of leverage, bankruptcy cost BV VB,
and total outstanding debt value DV VBT , the lev-
ered ﬁrm’s value WV VBT  can be written as
WV VBT = V +hV VB−BV VB (9)
where
hV VB =
(
1− 1− C1− E
1− 
)
C
r
[
1−
(
VB
V
)a+z]
+ ECEV VBT 
(
VB
V
)a+z
 (10)
BV VB= VB
(
VB
V
)a+z
 (11)
and C is corporate income tax rate, E is the effective
tax rate on equity returns, and EC is the capital gains
tax rate on equity. Both dividends and capital gains of
stock are subject to taxes. Dividend income is taxed at
the ordinary income tax rate  , and capital gains are
taxed at the capital gains rate EC . The effective tax
rate on equity returns E is the weighted average of
dividend and capital gains tax rates.
Graham (2003) suggests that the effective equity tax
rate is E = 1−  +  , where the weight depends
on payout ratio  and EC =  (Graham 2003, p. 1095;
2000, p. 1912; 1999, p. 153). Bankruptcy cost BV VB
is similar to that in Leland and Toft (1996). Equity
value EV VBT  is given by
EV VBT 
=
(
V +
(
1− 1− C1− E
1− 
)
C
r
[
1−
(
VB
V
)a+z]
−VB
(
VB
V
)a+z
−DV VBT 
)
·
(
1− EC
(
VB
V
)a+z)−1
# (12)
Appendix A provides the derivation of hV VB and
EV VBT ; all appendices are available online at
http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
Similar to Leland (1994), the model allows the ﬁrm
to operate with negative net worth as long as there
is enough asset value or new capital raised from
equity holders to meet the debt interest payment
before maturity. This setup differs from those mod-
els with a positive net worth covenant (e.g., Merton
1974, Longstaff and Schwartz 1995). In this endoge-
nous default model, equity holders optimally decide
on the timing of default. The default boundary VB can
be solved by using the smooth-pasting condition
,EV VBT 
,V
∣∣∣∣
V=VB
= 0# (13)
Without loss of generality, we set the initial unlevered
ﬁrm value V equal to 100. We then impose the fol-
lowing par-bond constraint that new debt is sold at
par value,
dV VB c pT V=100 = pT # (14)
Note that c and p are functions of V , VB, and T .
Using (12) and applying the smooth-pasting condition
in (13), we have
,E
,V
∣∣∣∣
V=VB
= ECa+ z
DV VBT − 1−VB
1− EC2
+
(
1+
[
1− 1− C1− E
1− 
]
Ca+ z
rVB
+a+z−
∫ T
0
-dt
)
·1−EC−1=0
(15)
where
-= ,dV VB c pT 
,V
∣∣∣∣
V=VB
# (16)
The expression of - is given in Appendix B. Given
-, T , and setting the initial asset value V t=0 = 100,
we are left with three unknowns: default trigger VB,
coupon ﬂow c, and the face value of newly issued
debt p. The par-bond condition in (14) allows us to
ﬁnd the solution for p:
pT  =
(
1− c
r
− e−rt 1− c
r

1− F T 
+
[
1−T VB −
1− c
r
]
GT 
)
· 1−.e−rt
1− F T +GT /
− e−rt1−
1− F T −1# (17)
Because c is a function of VB, this leaves VB as the
only unknown variable. The optimal value of VB can
be found by maximizing the ﬁrm value W :
,WV VBT 
,VB
∣∣∣∣
V=100
= 0# (18)
The ﬁrm value is a strictly concave function of default
trigger VB. Once the default boundary VB is deter-
mined, we can solve for the optimal values of debt
and equity, and hence the optimal leverage ratio l =
D/W .5 In general, VB depends on debt maturity, per-
sonal and corporate income taxes, risk-free rate, and
bankruptcy costs. The personal tax rates are embed-
ded in D (and p), which ultimately affects the default
boundary. Through their effect on VB, personal income
5 The smooth-pasting condition ensures that equity value is also
maximized when ﬁrm value is maximized.
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taxes affect ﬁrm value W and other characteristics.
Finally, the yield spread for the bond issue with matu-
rity T is calculated as YS = c/dV VBT − rf , where
rf is the before-tax interest rate of riskless (Treasury)
debt with the same maturity.
3. Numerical Analysis
Because the model does not have a closed-form solu-
tion, we conduct numerical analysis to examine per-
sonal tax effects on corporate capital structure and
bond yields. In each simulation, we partition each
year into 100 equal discrete intervals t. In solving
some equations, we employ the bisection method to
obtain the solution.6 We ﬁrst demonstrate how per-
sonal taxes affect the optimal capital structure, the
ﬁrm’s value, debt price, and yield spreads under dif-
ferent scenarios of interest rates, payout ratios, per-
sonal tax rates, and bankruptcy recovery rates. This
exercise allows us to compare our ﬁndings directly
with those of Leland and Toft (1996), who assume
away personal taxes and carry no model calibration.
Later, we calibrate the model to be consistent with
historical data and use it to assess the effects of taxes
on corporate bond yield spreads.
Capital gains and interest income from corporate
bonds are subject to both state and federal taxes,
whereas Treasury bond returns are subject only to
federal taxes. In reality, investors are subject to dif-
ferent tax rates, depending on their income status.7
Returns associated with pension funds, IRA accounts,
and insurance annuities are tax deferred. Also, insti-
tutions and ﬁrms are typically not permitted to hold
more than a small fraction of high-risk bonds. In fact,
some institutions are barred from investing in corpo-
rate bonds. These constraints may limit the partici-
pation of institutional investors in corporate bonds.
Thus, the marginal tax rate may vary for different
types of investors and for corporate bonds with dif-
ferent ratings.8 In the simulation, we ﬁrst set the per-
sonal income tax rates to a plausible range of 0%–35%
to cover a variety of potential clienteles. The capital
gains tax rate is a fraction of the income tax rate  ,
6 The bisection method is very efﬁcient for ﬁnding the solution
of nonlinear equations (see Judd 1998, p. 147). It is an iterative
method, which always converges, given the right range for the
domain of the independent variable.
7 Under the current U.S. tax laws, the highest corporate and indi-
vidual income tax rates are both equal to 35%. For most states, max-
imum marginal state income tax rates range between 5% and 10%.
8 Because of regulation, some institutions are prohibited from
investing in corporate bonds, and so they may just invest in Trea-
sury securities. It happens that these institutional investors are
often tax exempt (e.g., pension funds) or are in the lower tax
bracket. Thus, marginal investors in corporate bonds may have
higher tax rates than those in Treasury bonds. The authors thank
an anonymous referee for pointing out this fact.
where  is set equal to 0.5. Later, we use the empir-
ical tax rates documented by Graham (1999, 2000) to
assess tax effects. In the following, we investigate per-
sonal tax effects on the ﬁrm’s optimal ﬁnancing deci-
sions, ﬁrm characteristics, and bond yields.
3.1. Effects of Personal Taxes on Optimal
Leverage and Other Firm Characteristics
An important issue in corporate ﬁnance is whether
personal taxes affect the ﬁrm’s leverage when there
is default risk. In the absence of taxes and default,
Modigliani and Miller (1958; hereafter MM) show
that the ﬁrm value is independent of capital struc-
ture. With only corporate income taxes, the ﬁrm value
increases as the leverage increases (see MM 1958,
1963). Miller (1977) extends the MM (1958) model to
include personal and corporate taxes, and concludes
that capital structure decisions are irrelevant. Specif-
ically, in equilibrium, the corporate tax savings from
debt interest are completely offset by the tax penalty
on investors holding debt instead of equity. Thus,
changes in capital structure have no effect on the
ﬁrm value. These models provide qualitative guid-
ance but ignore default risk and bankruptcy costs.
Considering the effects of the endogenous default
strategy and bankruptcy costs may alter the inference
regarding the personal tax effect. Recently, Cooper
and Davydenko (2003) found that taxes and default
risk are independent under the assumption that lever-
age is not affected by personal taxes, and income and
capital gains tax rates are the same. It can be shown
that this conclusion will not hold if either of their
assumptions is violated (see Appendix C). In partic-
ular, if there is an interactive relationship between
personal taxes and leverage, personal taxes will affect
leverage, default risk, and credit spreads jointly.
We begin with the analysis of personal tax effects on
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions and characteristics. We
set asset volatility  = 0#2, interest rate r = 7#5%, and
payout ratio = 7%. These parameter values are sim-
ilar to those used by Leland and Toft (1996). In addi-
tion, corporate income tax rate C = 35%, personal
income tax rate for debt  ranges from 0%–35%, and
effective equity income tax rate E = 1−+ . We
choose bankruptcy costs  = 20% based on the ﬁnd-
ings from Andrade and Kaplan (1998). Table 1 reports
the results for the effects of taxes on ﬁrm character-
istics under different personal tax rates displayed in
column 1 and varying debt maturities (Panels A–D).
For ease of illustration, Figure 1 plots the ﬁrm value
as a function of leverage with different personal tax
rates and maturities (0.5, 5, 10, and 20 years). As
shown, personal taxes affect the ﬁrm value and the
optimal capital structure. The optimal leverage ratio
(corresponding to the maximum ﬁrm value) decreases
with the personal tax rate. For example, for maturity
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Table 1 Endogenously Determined Firm Characteristics Under Different Personal Taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Optimal
Total annual Total bankruptcy Optimal
Personal income Firm value Total debt coupon principal boundary leverage ratio
tax rate (%) W D C = cT P = pT VB (%)
Panel A: Firm issues debt with maturity T = 6 months
0 107.624 42.504 2.656 35.420 40.227 39.493
5 107.325 42.861 2.700 35.717 39.762 39.936
10 107.001 42.733 2.715 35.611 38.988 39.937
15 106.666 42.091 2.700 35.076 37.905 39.461
20 106.343 40.925 2.653 34.104 36.517 38.484
25 106.054 39.265 2.576 32.721 34.849 37.023
30 105.827 37.165 2.471 30.971 32.937 35.118
35 105.695 34.704 2.343 28.920 30.824 32.834
Panel B: Firm issues debt with maturity T = 5 years
0 111.19 57.99 4.76 56.47 50.89 52.15
5 110.16 54.82 4.46 53.41 48.64 49.76
10 109.21 51.49 4.16 50.19 46.22 47.15
15 108.36 48.05 3.86 46.87 43.68 44.34
20 107.62 44.54 3.57 43.49 41.04 41.38
25 107.02 41.05 3.29 40.11 38.38 38.36
30 106.56 37.64 3.03 36.81 35.75 35.33
35 106.26 34.37 2.78 33.64 33.18 32.35
Panel C: Firm issues debt with maturity T = 10 years
0 113.24 61.68 5.33 60.54 50.27 54.47
5 111.88 58.21 5.01 57.11 48.28 52.03
10 110.64 54.71 4.69 53.66 46.19 49.45
15 109.53 51.17 4.38 50.18 43.99 46.72
20 108.55 47.58 4.06 46.66 41.66 43.83
25 107.73 43.95 3.75 43.11 39.21 40.80
30 107.07 40.30 3.45 39.55 36.65 37.64
35 106.61 36.67 3.14 36.01 34.01 34.40
Panel D: Firm issues debt with maturity T = 20 years
0 114.76 63.76 5.60 63.09 48.73 55.56
5 113.17 59.98 5.27 59.28 46.90 53.00
10 111.71 56.23 4.94 55.51 44.98 50.34
15 110.41 52.51 4.61 51.78 42.96 47.56
20 109.26 48.79 4.29 48.07 40.82 44.65
25 108.28 45.08 3.98 44.39 38.58 41.63
30 107.49 41.38 3.67 40.72 36.23 38.50
35 106.89 37.69 3.36 37.08 33.77 35.26
Note. This table reports the optimal ﬁrm characteristics as a function of personal income tax rates 
 displayed in
column 1 for ﬁrms issuing debt with maturity T equal to 6 months (Panel A), 5 years (Panel B), 10 years (Panel C),
and 20 years (Panel D). We set before-tax risk-free interest rate r = 75%, payout ratio  = 7%, asset volatility
 = 20%, bankruptcy cost ratio  = 20%, and corporate tax rate 
C = 35%. The initial value of V is set to 100.
Personal income tax rates for debts 
 and effective equity tax rates 
E are linked by the formula 
E = 1−
 +

(see Engel et al. 1999, Graham 2003).
T = 6 months (Panel A), an increase in the ordinary
income tax rate  from 0% to 35% causes the optimal
leverage to drop from 40% to 33%. For maturity T =
20 years, it reduces the optimal leverage from 56% to
35%. Results show that the impact of taxes increases
with maturity and the ﬁrm value decreases with the
personal income tax rate.
The reasons for these outcomes are as follows. An
increase in personal tax rate  raises the cost of debt
because ﬁrms must issue debt at a lower price to com-
pensate investors for the higher tax burden. The drop
in debt price reduces the beneﬁt of the corporate tax
shield associated with leverage. This negative effect
on the tax shield increases with maturity.9 As a result,
an increase in  has a larger impact on the leverage of
the ﬁrm issuing long-term debt. On the other hand,
a higher  raises the effective tax rate on equity E ,
9 This is because long-maturity bonds carry more coupons and
a larger tax shield.
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Figure 1 Firm Value as a Function of Leverage with Different Personal Tax Rates
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Note. The value of the ﬁrm is plotted as a function of leverage for ﬁrms issuing debt with varying maturity T . For each maturity T , four personal tax rates
are applied. The parameter choices are similar to those in Leland and Toft (1996): the before-tax risk-free interest rate r = 75%, payout ratio = 7%, asset
volatility  = 20%, and corporate income tax rate 
C = 35%. We choose the bankruptcy cost ratio = 20% based on Andrade and Kaplan (1998). The initial
value of V is set to 100, and the default trigger VB is determined endogenously. The optimal leverage corresponds to the maximum ﬁrm value. The effective
equity tax rate is a weighted average of ordinary income and capital gains tax rates, where the weight is the payout ratio, i.e., 
E = 1− 
 + 
 .
which partially offsets the negative effect of  on debt
ﬁnancing. However, because the tax rate on debt is
higher than that on equity, an increase in tax rate 
still makes it less attractive for the ﬁrm to use debt.
Changes in capital structure are linked to changes
in other ﬁrm characteristics. Columns (2)–(6) of
Table 1 report changes in ﬁrm characteristics because
of changes in tax rates. For ease of illustration, we
also plot them in Figure 2. Panel F in Figure 2 shows
that the optimal leverage level is positively related
to debt maturity and negatively related to personal
tax rates. When  increases, both the optimal leverage
(Panel F) and default boundary VB (Panel E) decrease
because the cost of debt relative to equity increases.
Although lower leverage (and lower VB) reduces the
risk of debt, there is a decline in debt value D, prin-
cipal value P = pT , and total annual coupon liabil-
ity C = cT when the tax rate increases, as portrayed
in Panels B, C, and D, respectively. Results suggest
that the negative effect of the tax penalty on debt
cost outweighs the positive effect of lower default
risk. Similarly, the ﬁrm value W decreases with 
because of the decrease in leverage and the reduc-
tion in the tax shield. Firms issuing debts with longer
maturity experience a bigger drop in these values. In
general, these effects associated with taxes increase at
a decreasing rate as maturity rises.
A closer examination of the optimal default bound-
ary VB in Figure 2 (Panel E), the total principal P
(Panel D), and the total outstanding debt value D
(Panel B) shows that VB can be set either below P (for
T = 10 and 20 years) or above it (for T = 6 months).
Default is triggered not because the ﬁrm valueW falls
beneath P , but because the anticipated equity appre-
ciation does not warrant the additional contribution
required from equity holders to avoid default on debt
service payments. The anticipated equity apprecia-
tion is lower over a shorter time horizon. Conse-
quently, a ﬁrm issuing short-term debt has to set a
higher default trigger VB to raise debt capital. Default
may occur despite the fact that net worth is positive.
Conversely, a ﬁrm issuing long-term debt can set VB
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Figure 2 Firm Characteristics as a Function of Personal Income Tax Rate
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Note. Firm characteristics are plotted as a function of personal income tax rate for ﬁrms issuing debt with varying maturity T . We set the before-tax risk-free
interest rate r = 75%, payout ratio = 7%, asset volatility  = 20%, bankruptcy cost ratio = 20%, and corporate income tax rate 
C = 35%. The initial value
of V is set to 100, and the default trigger VB is determined endogenously. The effective equity tax rate is a weighted average of ordinary income and capital
gains tax rates, where the weight is the payout ratio, i.e., 
E = 1− 
 + 
 .
lower than P because higher long-term equity appre-
ciation makes it easier to meet its debt obligations.
3.2. Yield on Outstanding Debt and Term
Structure of Spreads
We next examine yields of both outstanding and
newly issued debts. The upper panel of Figure 3 plots
yields to maturity for outstanding debts (with the
issuance maturity T = 20 years) as a function of matu-
rity for ﬁrms at different levels of leverage and under
three tax rate scenarios: 0%, 15%, and 30%. Bond
yield increases with time to maturity and leverage.
Given a tax rate, the marginal impact of leverage on
yields increases as leverage rises. When  = 0, we
obtain similar results to Leland and Toft (1996). In
the absence of personal taxes and accounting infor-
mation noise, yields to maturity on debts issued by
the ﬁrms with different leverage levels merge as debts
approach maturity because default risk becomes neg-
ligible for all debts. As time to maturity rises, the
yield spread widens because of increasing differences
in default risk. When there are personal taxes, yield
increases with  . The marginal impact of the tax rate
on yields is larger as time to maturity increases.
The lower panels of Figure 3 show yield spreads
on newly issued debts with different maturities and
tax rates for ﬁrms with the leverage of 30% and 50%.
In the lower left panel, the yield spread curve is
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Figure 3 Yield to Maturity on Outstanding Debt and Yield Spread on Newly Issued Debt
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Note. The upper panel shows the yield to maturity on a 20-year bond under three leverage ratios l (30%, 50%, and 70%) and three personal tax rates (
 = 0%,
15%, and 30%). The lower panels are for newly issued debt for ﬁrms with leverage ratio of 30% and 50%. The lower left panel plots the spread for four
issuance maturities (T = 05, 5, 10, and 20 years) as a function of personal tax rate. The lower right panel plots the term structure of spreads under four
different personal tax rates (
 = 0%, 10%, 20%, and 30%). The default boundary VB is endogenously determined. Before-tax risk-free interest rate r = 75%,
payout ratio = 7%, asset volatility  = 20%, bankruptcy cost ratio = 20%, and corporate income tax rate 
C = 35%. The initial value of V is set to 100. The
effective equity tax rate is a weighted average of ordinary income and capital gains tax rates, where the weight is the payout ratio, i.e., 
E = 1− 
 + 
 .
drawn as a function of the personal tax rate  for four
issuance maturities: T = 6 months, 5 years, 10 years,
and 20 years. The results show that spreads increase
with the personal tax rate and leverage. Note that
when maturity is six months, the spread curve for the
leverage of 50% is only slightly higher than that for
the leverage of 30% and so it is almost indistinguish-
able. In the lower right panel, the spread is plotted as
a function of issuance maturity T under different per-
sonal tax rates. The spread curve has a different shape
for different leverage ratios. At a ﬁxed personal tax
rate, the spread in basis points increases with issuance
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maturity, but the rate of increase depends on the
leverage ratio and maturity. Moreover, the marginal
impact of the tax rate on spreads is higher for the
high-leverage ﬁrm.
We next examine the sensitivity of yield spread to
the risk-free interest rate and payout ratio. In addi-
tion to the baseline case (see the lower panels of
Figure 3) with r = 7#5% and payout = 7%, we exam-
ine four other scenarios: low interest rate and payout
ratio (r = 4#5% and  = 4%, Panel A), high interest
rate and payout ratio (r = 9% and = 7%, Panel D),
and medium interest rate with low and high payouts,
respectively (r = 6% and = 4%, Panel B, and r = 6%
and = 5#5%, Panel C). Personal tax rates are set to
0%, 10%, 20%, and 30%. Figure 4 plots the results.
Comparing the results in Panels A and B of Figure 4
(where  is ﬁxed at 4%) shows that a higher r gener-
ally results in a lower yield spread, except for short-
maturity bonds. A higher r implies that the ﬁrm value
is likely to drift to a higher level in the future. Because
bond investors expect that the ﬁrm will have less dif-
ﬁculty to service the debt, they require a lower pre-
mium. The effect of interest rate on spread increases
with maturity because the ﬁrm value will rise to a
higher level over a longer horizon.
Comparing Panel B to C of Figure 4, we ﬁnd that
the spread increases with the payout ratio. The spread
Figure 4 Yield Spread on Newly Issued Debt as a Function of Personal Income Tax Rate Under Alternative Interest Rates and Payout Ratios
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Note. This ﬁgure shows the term structure of yield spreads under different tax rates for ﬁrms with a leverage ratio of 30%. Four panels represent low interest
rate and low payout (Panel A), high interest rate and high payout (Panel D), medium interest rate with low payout (Panel B), and medium interest rate with
relatively high payout (Panel C), respectively. Asset volatility  = 20%, bankruptcy cost ratio  = 20%, corporate income tax rate 
C = 35%, and personal
income tax rates are from 0% to 30%. The effective equity tax rate and personal income tax rate 
 are linked by 
E = 1− 
 + 
 . The initial value of V is
set to 100, and the default trigger VB is determined endogenously.
increases because the reduced net drift rate r − 
implies that the ﬁrm value W cannot reach the same
level as it does with the original drift rate. Because the
ﬁrm is expected to have greater difﬁculty in raising
equity capital for its debt payments, investors require
a higher yield on the debt. This effect is greater for
bonds with longer issuance maturity.
In controlling for the level of the net drift rate, the
spread increases when both r and  increase. With the
same net drift rate r −  = 2%, the spread increases
from Panel B to D. Because the net drift rate does
not change, the growth rate of the ﬁrm value is not
affected. However, an increase in the interest rate
raises the discount rate for coupon payments, caus-
ing the debt value to decrease and yield the spread to
widen. This impact increases with maturity and the
personal tax rate.
4. Model Calibration and Tax Effects
on Spreads
We have shown that personal taxes can markedly
affect the default boundary, the ﬁrm’s characteris-
tics, and yield spreads. These results provide rel-
evant information for direct comparison with the
Leland-Toft (1996) model and other term structure
models that ignore personal taxes. However, when
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using the model to predict yield spread, it is impor-
tant to verify whether the model-implied default prob-
ability and the loss rate given default are indeed con-
sistent with historical default loss experience. Huang
and Huang (2003) provide an excellent example in this
respect by showing that proper model calibration is
essential to generate robust results and consistent esti-
mates of credit yield spreads. In this section, we adopt
a similar approach to calibrate our model.
4.1. Model Calibration
We calibrate our model to ensure that it will predict
an expected level of default loss equal to that actually
experienced by bondholders. We employ the histori-
cal default probability and average default loss rate
for each rating class as target values for model cal-
ibration. The model is required to generate default
parameters that match these actual data associated
with different rating classes. In addition, we make
use of the historical equity premium associated with
each rating class. In our model, the default probabil-
ity depends on the ﬁrm’s asset risk premium, which
is unobservable, but closely linked to the equity pre-
mium. Because equity market data are more reliable
than corporate bond market data, the equity premium
data provide important information to estimate the
ﬁrm’s asset risk premium more accurately. A devi-
ation of our calibration from Huang and Huang’s
(2003) procedure is that we let the model endoge-
nize the ﬁrm’s leverage to generate the optimal capital
structure consistent with historical default experience.
This procedure grants the model maximal ﬂexibility
in ﬁtting default data. The method of calibration is
explained in more detail in Appendix D. The target
values of the selected parameters and average his-
torical spreads for each rated bond with maturity of
10 years are displayed in Table 2. We focus on 10-
year bonds because the ratings provided by Moody’s
are based on 10-year default frequencies. All the data
except recovery rates are acquired from Huang and
Huang (2003). We employ a bankruptcy cost ratio
 equal to 20% of the ﬁrm value as suggested
by Andrade and Kaplan (1998). Finally, as noted by
Huang and Huang (2003), average historical corpo-
rate spreads are not precise, but they serve as impor-
tant references for comparison with the yield spreads
calculated by the model.
4.2. Effects of Personal Taxes on Spreads
We initially calibrate the model by assigning an
exogenous tax rate. Table 3 reports the results for the
debt with issuance maturity T = 10 years, interest rate
r = 7#5%, and payout ratio  = 7%. These results are
calculated under four personal tax scenarios: no taxes,
taxes on debt but not on equity, taxes on both debt
and equity, and tax rates based on Graham’s (1999)
empirical estimates.
Table 2 Parameters for Model Calibration
Target parameters
Recovery Equity Cumulative default Average yield
Credit rate premium probability spread
rating (%) (%) (%) (bps)
AAA 80 5.38 077 63
AA 80 5.60 099 91
A 80 5.99 155 123
BBB 80 6.55 439 194
BB 80 7.30 2063 320
B 80 8.76 4391 470
Note. This table shows the target values of the parameters that our model will
conform to after calibration. The last column includes the average observed
yield spreads. Except for the recovery rates, the data presented here are
directly taken from Huang and Huang (2003) for the period 1973–1993.
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Eom et al. (2003) indicate that the cost of
ﬁnancial distress  is in the range of 15% to 20% of the ﬁrm’s going concern
value. We choose 80% as the target recovery rate, which is close to that used
by Huang and Huang (2003) in the Leland-Toft (1996) model for A and Baa
bonds. Note that the recovery rate here is measured as the percentage of the
ﬁrm value at default.
Column 3 of Table 3 shows the yield spreads pre-
dicted by the model calibrated without personal taxes
 = 0. Because personal taxes are assumed away,
these model-inferred spreads largely reﬂect default
premiums. The results show that default risk explains
about 31%–67% of the observed spreads for bonds of
different ratings. The proportion of spread explained
by the model tends to be higher for junk bonds. This
ﬁnding is consistent with Huang and Huang (2003).
Column 4 of Table 3 reports the estimated spread
where we set  = 20% and E = 0.10 Here, we
assume no taxes on equity. Adding personal taxes
for bond returns generally increases the predicted
spread. The increase is larger for investment-grade
bonds. For example, the predicted spread for AAA
bonds increases from 26 bps to 42 bps, a 62% increase.
The proportion of observed spread explained by the
model ranges from 36% to 67%.
The results in column 4 of Table 3 assume no taxes
on equity returns, which exaggerates the tax disad-
vantage of corporate bond investments. In reality,
investors’ equity returns are also subject to taxes. We
next incorporate taxes for equity returns (column 5).
An ordinary income tax rate  of 20% and pay-
out ratio  of 7% would imply an effective equity
return tax rate E of 10.7% according to the formula
E = 1 −  +  (see Graham 2003).11 Results in
10 This tax rate is within the range of estimates by Liu et al. (2004).
The purpose here is to set a reasonable tax rate to see its impact
on yield spread. Later, we use Graham’s (1999) empirical tax rate,
which will be slightly higher.
11 This formula implicitly assumes that there is a certain marginal
investor who owns both equity and debt.
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Table 3 Yield Spreads, Default, and Tax Premiums
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observed Default only 
 = 20% 
E = 0 
 = 20% 
E = 107% 
 = 2243% 
E = 12%
Rating spread (bps) (bps), (%) (bps), (%) (bps), (%) (bps), (%)
AAA 63 26 41% 42 67% 51 81% 55 87%
AA 91 30 33% 45 49% 55 60% 59 65%
A 123 38 31% 50 41% 63 51% 67 54%
BBB 194 64 32% 69 36% 88 45% 92 47%
BB 320 160 50% 152 48% 176 55% 180 56%
B 470 315 67% 317 67% 330 71% 334 71%
Note. The bankruptcy cost ratio = 20%, interest rate r = 75%, and payout ratio = 7%. Column 2 shows the
average observed spreads on 10-year bonds and column 3 reports the spreads generated by the model calibrated
without taxes. Columns 4–6 report the spreads generated by the model for different personal tax scenarios. In
column 4, equity tax is set equal to zero. In column 5, equity tax rate is estimated as a weighted average of personal
income tax and capital gains tax rates, i.e., 
E = 1− 
 + 
 . In column 6, we adopt the average equity tax rate

E = 12% estimated by Graham (1999). The numbers in parentheses express the model-generated spread as a
percentage of the observed spread.
column 5 show that personal taxes explain an even
greater proportion of the observed spread after incor-
porating this equity tax rate. This is because taxes on
equity increase the ﬁrm’s incentive to issue more debt,
thereby offsetting the negative effect of debt taxes on
leverage. For example, compared to the case without
taxes, the predicted spread for AAA bonds increases
from 26 bps to 51 bps, a 96% increase. The propor-
tion of observed spreads explained by the model now
ranges from 45% to 81%.
Goldstein et al. (2001) also consider taxes on equity
in their study. Our model differs from theirs in several
aspects. First, we include state taxes in the personal
tax package for bond investors. Second, we allow for
tax rebates when default occurs. Third, our model
permits an interactive effect between default and
taxes. The interactive effect arises mainly from the dif-
ferential treatments of ordinary income and capital
gains. We show in Appendix C that this interactive
effect has a positive impact on yield spread. Because
these factors are left out, the yield spread between
corporate and Treasury bonds mainly reﬂects the tax-
induced default premium in the Goldstein et al. (2001)
model.12 An increase in tax rate would reduce the
ﬁrm’s leverage and lower default, resulting in a lower
yield spread. In addition, in their model, the tax ben-
eﬁt of debt becomes smaller as cash ﬂow falls to a
certain level and the ﬁrm loses part of its tax shelter,
which leads to an optimally lower leverage and lower
yield spreads (see also Strebulaev 2004). By contrast,
our model captures the effects of the three important
tax factors. Including state taxes leads to an increase
in corporate bond yield as investors require a com-
pensation for the increased tax burden. If the com-
12 This is because both Treasury and corporate bonds are subject to
the federal tax rate because state taxes are ignored.
bined effect of state taxes and the tax-default interac-
tion (including tax rebates at default) outweighs the
effect of reduced leverage, yield spread will increase.
Our results show that in most cases, corporate bond
yield spread increases when both debt and equity
taxes are taken into account. The only exception is for
BB bonds in column 4 of Table 3, where the leverage
effect dominates, causing a decrease in spread.
The results above are obtained by assigning an arbi-
trary income tax rate. Graham (1999) estimates that
the marginal equity return tax rate E is close to 12%.
This implies an ordinary income tax rate  of 22.43%
given that E = 1 −  +  ( is 7% and  is
0.5). Using these empirical tax rates, we re-estimate
spreads, which are displayed in column 6 of Table 3.
The spreads predicted by the model increase further,
ranging from 47% to 87%. Using more realistic debt
and equity income tax rates raises the size of predic-
tive spreads considerably, especially for investment-
grade bonds. For example, compared to the model
without personal taxes, the proportion of observed
spreads explained by the model with taxes increases
from 41% to 87% for AAA bonds, 33% to 65% for AA
bonds, 31% to 54% for A bonds, and 32% to 47% for
BBB bonds. On the other hand, taxes add only about
6% to the predicted spreads for junk bonds. This is
because junk bonds have high default risk where the
default premium accounts for a large portion of the
spread. Given the large default premium, the propor-
tion of the added tax premium to the total spread is
relatively small.
The results in column 6 of Table 3 show that there
is still some spread left unexplained, particularly for
medium- and low-grade bonds. Part of the remain-
ing spread could be attributed to liquidity risk unac-
counted for by the model. Recently, de Jong and
Driessen (2004) reported estimates of liquidity premi-
ums for bonds of different ratings ranging from about
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Table 4 Personal Income Tax Rates Implied by the Observed Spreads
on 10-Year Bonds
Implied personal
tax rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observed Liquidity Nonliquidity Income Equity
Credit spread component component tax rate tax rate
rating (bps) (bps) (bps) (%) (%)
AAA 63 16 47 174 93
AA 91 34 57 211 113
A 123 56 67 225 120
BBB 194 96 98 264 141
BB 320 100 220 407 218
B 470 100 370 358 192
Average implied tax rates All ratings 273 146
Investment grade 219 117
Note. This table reports the implied income tax rates obtained by calibrating
the model to match the nonliquidity spread component. The equity tax rate

E = 1− 
 + 
 , bankruptcy cost ratio = 20%, interest rate r = 75%,
and payout ratio = 7%. The liquidity component of spread in column 3 is
taken from de Jong and Driessen (2004). For AAA and AA bonds, because
of a large discrepancy between intermediate-term (5 years) and long-term
bonds (10–22 years), we take the average of them. The nonliquidity compo-
nent in column 4 is obtained by subtracting the liquidity spread in column 3
from the observed spread in column 2.
16 bps to 100 bps for bonds with ratings of AAA
to B (see column 3 of Table 4). If we add these liq-
uidity premium estimates to the spreads predicted by
the model in column 6, we can almost perfectly pre-
dict the spreads for all investment-grade bonds. Even
for junk bonds, the estimated spreads are on aver-
age slightly more than 90% of the observed spreads.
Figure 5 plots the sum of the default, tax, and liquid-
ity spreads for bonds in each rating class.
Furthermore, we can calibrate the model to gener-
ate spread estimates consistent with historical spreads
by allowing tax rates to be endogenously determined.
This procedure contrasts with that in Table 3 where
tax rates are exogenously assigned. We can then com-
pare the model-implied tax rates with empirical tax
rates and evaluate the model’s performance. If the
implied tax rates are indeed close to the empirical tax
rates (e.g., Graham 1999), it would suggest that the
model performs well. However, to obtain more rea-
sonable implied tax rates, we must account for the
potential liquidity effect to avoid its being miscon-
strued as the tax effect. To control for the liquidity
effect, we adjust the observed spread by the liquidity
premium estimated by de Jong and Driessen (2004) to
come up with the nonliquidity component of spread,
which is reported in column 4 of Table 4. We then cali-
brate the model against this adjusted spread to obtain
the implied marginal income tax rate.
Column 5 of Table 4 reports the implied tax rates
for bonds of different ratings. The implied ordinary
Figure 5 Observed Spreads and Model-Generated Spreads After
Calibration
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Note. The bankruptcy cost ratio = 20%, and the corporate income tax rate

C = 35%. For each bond rating, we plot the model-generated spread with
default risk only and the incremental spread after including personal taxes,
where the personal income tax rate 
 is linked to the effective equity tax rate

E by the formula 
E = 1− 
 + 
 (see Engel et al. 1999 and Graham
2003) with 
E equal to 12% based on Graham (1999). The thinnest column
includes the liquidity premium taken from de Jong and Driessen (2004). The
curve with dots traces the average observed spreads on 10-year bonds of
different ratings from Huang and Huang (2003).
income tax rates  range from 17.4% to 40.7%, and
the corresponding equity return tax rates E range
from 9.3% to 21.8%. The average implied equity tax
rate is 11.7% for investment-grade bonds, which is
almost the same as Graham’s (1999) estimate for the
equity tax rate. The average implied ordinary income
tax rate for investment-grade bonds is about 22%,
which is also very close to the 22.43% mark implied by
the equity tax rate of 12% reported by Graham (1999).
By contrast, the average implied income tax rate for
junk bonds is 38%, which is relatively high com-
pared to the estimates for investment-grade bonds. As
shown in Figure 5, about 10% of the observed spread
for junk bonds is left unexplained when we plug in
 = 22#43%. As expected, the implied income tax rate
has to be higher to catch up with the observed junk
bond spread when we calibrate the model. Although
the implied tax rate seems high, it is below the max-
imum statutory personal income tax rate over the
period (1973–1993) covered by our calibration. Fur-
thermore, the implied tax rate for junk bonds is below
the maximum rate of 48% and, in fact, is only slightly
above the mean of 35% estimated by Graham (1999)
for the tax rate of the marginal investor of government
bonds over the period 1980–1994.13 Thus, it might be
13 See Graham (1999, p. 161). Graham’s estimates are based on the
difference between the one-year Treasury bill rate and the one-year
prime grade munis.
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premature to assert that the relatively high implied
tax rate for junk bonds is because of missing factors.
Notwithstanding this caveat, the model appears to
explain the spreads of investment-grade bonds reason-
ably well.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we incorporate the effects of personal
taxes into the term structure model. The structural
model provides an integrated framework that simul-
taneously deals with the issues of capital structure,
default probability, and yield spreads. It offers a uni-
ﬁed approach for analyzing the behavior of lever-
age, default risk, and yield spreads as the ﬁrm’s as-
set value, risk, taxes, interest rate, payout ratio, and
bankruptcy costs change. We ﬁnd that personal taxes
affect the optimal leverage level and the ﬁrm value
in the presence of default risk and bankruptcy costs.
Given the maturity of debt, the default boundary
is determined endogenously, which sets the optimal
level of debt. Personal taxes have an impact on the
ﬁrm’s leverage by affecting the debt value and default
boundary. On the one hand, personal taxes lower
default boundary, leverage, and default risk. On the
other hand, personal taxes reduce the net payoff of
bonds, and so investors require higher yields to com-
pensate for the tax burden. These tax-related effects
depend on the marginal investor’s income tax rate and
the interaction between default and personal taxes.
In general, the negative effect of the tax penalty out-
weighs the positive effect of reduced default risk,
resulting in a higher yield spread.
With the model calibrated to actual default experi-
ence, results show that ignoring personal taxes leads
to considerable underestimation of yield spreads. The
model without taxes explains only 31% to 41% of
observed investment-grade bond spreads. By contrast,
using more realistic tax rates documented in the lit-
erature, we ﬁnd that the model explains 47% to 87%
of these spreads. Results show that personal taxes
account for a substantial proportion of the corporate-
Treasury spread for high-grade bonds.
We further estimate the implied income tax rates
by calibrating the model against the observed spreads
adjusted for a reasonable amount of liquidity pre-
mium. We ﬁnd that the implied personal income tax
rates for investment grade bonds are very close to
empirical tax rates. The implied income tax rates for
junk bonds are higher but still within the range esti-
mated by Graham (1999).
Finally, although personal taxes play an important
role, liquidity risk should also be taken into account to
better explain corporate bond spread. In this paper, we
use an ad hoc approach to add the liquidity premium
to the spread estimated by the structural model. This
approach ignores the interactive effect between default
and liquidity risk. This effect is likely to be positive;
that is, lower grade bonds tend to have lower liquidity
(see Ericsson and Renault 2001). Ignoring this inter-
active default-liquidity effect may understate the cor-
porate bond spread. Because this effect is potentially
more important for junk bonds, it may explain why
the model still underestimates the spreads of these
bonds. Nevertheless, to fully account for this interac-
tive default-liquidity effect, one would need to model
liquidity risk explicitly. We leave this for future work.
An online supplement to this paper is available on
the Management Science website (http://mansci.pubs.
informs.org/ecompanion.html).
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